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WATER PRIVATIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES: THE 
NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 
Sarah I. Hale† 
Abstract: Water is widely recognized as an essential element to sustain life, yet 
attaining universal access to clean drinking water remains a perplexing issue throughout 
the lesser-developed world.  In 1997, with backing from private investment and the 
World Bank, the Philippine government privatized the municipal water utility of Manila 
in an effort to improve service and promote efficiency.  Nearly ten years later, 
privatization has failed to produce results and instead has engendered a contentious and 
polemical debate about the merits of privatization.  Indeed, for policy makers, the case 
study of Manila has become a focal point in the debate about whether private companies 
or governments should operate municipal water utilities.  
This Comment argues that current models for water services, whether private or 
public, will continually fail to address the economic, social, and political needs of lesser-
developed nations unless they recognize the human right to water.  Although it has not 
attained the status of binding international law, the human right to water offers an 
alternative model for understanding the terms of the privatization debate.  In the context 
of privatization, states must protect the human right to water through strong regulatory 
measures that guarantee access to water and prevent private companies from infringing 
on this right.  
Privatization in the Philippines currently does not protect the human right to water,  
and in future plans, the Philippine government should take steps to acknowledge and 
protect this right through strong regulatory controls and a universal access plan.  This 
issue is timely for the Asian Pacific region, with its large number of failing privatized 
water systems.  Water as a human right will be a useful model for the entire region.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, the World Health Organization estimated that 1.1 billion 
people lacked access to adequate drinking water and 2.6 billion people still 
needed improved sanitation.1  The lack of safe drinking water, sanitation, and 
hygiene has resulted in serious diseases that kill an estimated 2 million 
people each year.2  A child dies every fifteen seconds from diarrhoeal 
diseases, which are most commonly related to contaminated drinking water 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Joel Ngugi, Roy Prosterman, Alexander Morrow, and the 
editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their guidance, suggestions, and assistance in the 
development of this Comment.   
1
 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (“WHO”), WATER, SANITATION AND HYGIENE LINKS TO 
HEALTH: FACTS AND FIGURES UPDATED (2004) available at http://www.who.int/water_ 
sanitation_health/publications/facts2004/en/.  See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL 
WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION ASSESSMENT 2000 REPORT (2000) (describing the importance of clean 
drinking water for development, health, and sustainability).  
2
 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE RIGHT TO WATER 6 (2003), available at 
http://www.who.int/ water_sanitation_health/rightowater/en/rtwrev.pdf. 
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and inadequate sanitation.3  A vast majority of people who lack access to 
adequate water and sanitation live in lesser-developed countries.4  For the 
Asian Pacific region, access to safe drinking water is an especially 
significant issue; a majority of countries in the region, a third of the 
population lacks sufficient sanitation services.5  The Asian Development 
Bank has identified water as an essential component in improving the lives 
of the region’s 900 million poor people.6  Given these numbers, it should be 
no surprise that the issue of water has become important on the world’s 
political stage.  The United Nations has declared 2005-2015 to be the 
“International Decade for Action, ‘Water for Life.’”7 
Privatization of water utilities has become a central strategy both 
globally and in the Asian Pacific region for dealing with the water crisis.8  
Privatization typically involves the transfer of water utilities from public 
ownership to private sector ownership and operation.9  In recent years, 
international financial and development organizations encouraged, and often 
required, lesser-developed countries to privatize state-owned companies in 
exchange for investment capital and loans for development projects.10  
Privatization has been implemented in cities across the world including 
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Nkobongo, South Africa.11  
Water privatization is a big business; revenue from the global trade in water 
                                           
3
 Id. at 7. 
4
 Id. at 6. 
5
 CASTALIA STRATEGIC ADVISORS, SECTOR NOTE ON WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION FOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC FLAGSHIP 6-7 (2004), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPINFRASTRUCT/Resources/855084-1137106254308/ 
EAPWaterandSanitation.pdf  [hereinafter SECTOR NOTE ON WATER SUPPLY]. 
6
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, WATER FOR ALL: THE WATER POLICY OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT 
BANK 1 (2003). 
7
 International Decade for Action, Water for Life, G.A. Res. 58/217, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 78th 
plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/217 (Dec. 23, 2003); SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & SIOBHÁN 
MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS 82 (2004). 
8
 ADA KARINA IZAGUIRRE  & CATHERINE HUNT, PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR 4 
(2005), available at http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/Financing_water_for_all/Gurria_Task_ 
Force/privatewater2004.pdf (estimating fifty-two new water privatization projects between 1999-2004, 
thirty of which took place in the Asian region). 
9
 See Mark Baker, Privatization in the Developing World: Panacea for the Economic Ills of the 
Third World or Prescription Overused?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233 (1999); Water in People’s 
Hands: Building Perspectives and Alternatives, Proceedings from the National Conference on Freshwater, 
19-21 March 2004, Philippines, at 9 (2004), available at http://www.freedomfromdebtcoalition.org (a study 
by the Global Challenge Initiative, which randomly reviewed IMF loan policies in forty countries found out 
that in the year 2000 alone, IMF loan agreements in twelve countries included conditions imposing water 
privatization or full cost recovery). 
10
 See Baker, supra note 9, at 234; Jennifer Naegele, What’s Wrong with Full-fledged Water 
Privatization?, 6 J. L. SOC. CHALLENGES 99, 109 (2004). 
11
 Center for Public Integrity, The Water Barons, http://www.publicintegrity.org/water/default.aspx  
(last visited Feb. 28, 2006). 
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amounts to more than US $800 billion annually,12 exceeding that of the 
global trade in the pharmaceutical industry.13  Despite the apparent boom in 
water privatization, however, the industry is in crisis.  The largest 
transnational companies are rescinding and canceling agreements in the 
lesser-developed world, including projects in Asia.  Most importantly, policy 
makers disagree about the best course of action.14   
Economists, development experts, and activists actively debate the 
merits of privately or publicly owned water utilities.15  On one side, 
proponents of neo-liberal economic reforms offer privatization as a panacea 
for expanding water service, arguing the private sector is better suited than 
governments to delivering services because it is more efficient and 
responsive to consumer needs.16  On the other side, advocates of publicly 
owned water utilities consider water privatization to be part of a larger 
globalization trend, which allows multinational companies to exploit third 
world markets and resources.17  Indeed, the water sector has become a key 
battlefield for a much larger debate about neo-liberal economics and 
privatization.18  Critics of privatization contest the commodification of water 
and argue the private sector has no role in selling what is essentially a public 
resource.19  Thus far, both sides of this polarized and entrenched debate have 
failed to address the realities of many lesser-developed nations, and the 
debate has become stale. 
Rather than focusing merely on the structures of ownership, 
governments should pay attention to the significant and essential role of 
water in sustaining life when formulating water policy, including 
                                           
12
 Ana Maria R. Nemenzo, Address at the Asia Pacific Conference on Debt and Privatization of 
Water and Power Services (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.jubileesouth.org/news/ 
EpZZZZVEEEdDlvekyi.shtml. 
13
 Maude Barlow & Tony Clarke, Who Owns Water?, NATION, Sept. 2, 2002, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020902/barlow. 
14
 See How Not to Help Those in Need, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2004; JOHN SOUSSAN, WATER AND 
POVERTY IN THE 3RD WORLD WATER FORUM (2004) (discussing the variety of policy perspectives and 
proposed solutions). 
15
 See How Not to Help Those in Need, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2004; JOHN SOUSSAN, WATER AND 
POVERTY IN THE 3RD WORLD WATER FORUM (2004) (discussing the variety of policy perspectives and 
proposed solutions to the insufficient clean drinking water). 
16
 Naegele, supra note 10, at 109. 
17
 See e.g., Anita Roddick, Introduction, TROUBLED WATER: SAINTS, SINNERS, TRUTH, AND LIES 
ABOUT THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 8 (Anita Roddick & Brooke Shelby Biggs eds., 2004); VANDANA 
SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND PROFIT 24 (2002); BRENDAN MARTIN, IN THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST? PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 10 (1993). 
18
 Erik Swyngedouw, Dispossessing H2O: The Contested Terrain of Water Privatization, 
CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM, Mar. 2005, at 81. 
19
 See generally  SHIVA, supra note 17, at 87-105 (explaining how multinational corporations  have 
profited from the commodification of water, with little benefit to the public).  
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implementing privatization.  Several international documents, as well as the 
domestic laws of a number of nations, recognize water as an essential human 
right, which must be protected by the state.20  The concept of water as a 
human right explicitly mandates that both private and publicly owned water 
utilities respect this right.  A policy based on water as a human right would 
protect the public interest while simultaneously reaping the benefits of 
private sector involvement, namely efficiency and capital investment.  
Manila, the capital city of the Philippines, serves as an important 
example of how privatization has been implemented in Asia.  The 
experience of privatization in Manila shows how private sector involvement 
harms the human right to water through high prices, inadequate access, and 
insufficient quality, which pose real threats to human health.21  The 1997 
privatization of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (“MWSS”) 
in Manila has failed to provide affordable clean drinking water and sewer 
services.  Despite the plan’s stated goals to expand water service to all of the 
city’s 11 million residents and provide the utility with financial solvency, the 
privatization of the MWSS has not delivered meaningful improvements in 
service and access.22  Like many privatization agreements, the agreement 
privatizing water in Manila contained little regulation or oversight to protect 
the public interest. 23  The Philippines is also a useful example because it 
demonstrates how lesser-developed nations in the Asian Pacific region lack 
sufficient capital to assume public ownership of water utilities.  After a 
severe financial crisis in the MWSS, the Philippine government has recently 
acquired eighty-four percent of the failing utility and plans to re-privatize it 
by mid-2006.24  
This Comment asserts that as the restructuring of the MWSS occurs, 
the Philippines government should enact legislation that formally recognizes 
the human right to water and create water policies that realize this right.  Part 
II details the privatization experience in Manila.  Part III of this Comment 
outlines the polarized debate over privatization and explains why both 
positions have become stale and ultimately inadequate.  Part IV describes 
                                           
20
 Stephen McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992); Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15 on the Right to Water, U.N. 
ESCOR, 29th Sess., Agenda item 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2003) [hereinafter Comment 15]. 
21
 Public Citizen, Privatization Fiascos: Philippines, http://www.citizen.org/cmep/Water/cmep_ 
Water/reports/philippines/articles.cfm?ID=9209 (last visited Oct. 15, 2005). 
22
 FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, LESSONS FROM A FAILED PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCE: THE 
CASE OF THE PHILIPPINES’ METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM 1-2 (2005), available at 
http://www.freedomfromdebtcoalition.org/main/pages/water%20monograph.pdf. 
23
 Id. at 3. 
24
 Eileen A. Mencias, Gov’t Plans Maynilad Sale, MANILA STANDARD, Nov. 29, 2005. 
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how the international community is developing the notion of a human right 
to water through both multinational agreements and domestic laws.  
Understanding water as a human right shifts the discourse about 
privatization by focusing on the essential and important role of water in 
sustaining life.  Because access to water is a fundamental human right, 
nation-states must protect this right and prevent private companies from 
infringing on this right.  Part V argues the human right to water requires the 
implementation of regulations to ensure this right is protected.  Part VI 
describes the inadequacy of current regulations in the Philippines and the 
inability of these regulations to protect the human right to water in Manila.  
Part VII recommends that the Philippines formally recognize the human 
right to water, subsidize water for the poor to achieve universal access, and 
adopt a regulatory system centered on the notion of the availability of water 
as a human right. 
II. DESPITE THE PROMISES OF PRIVATIZATION, WATER AND SEWER 
SERVICES CONTINUE TO FAIL 
The privatization of the MWSS is an illustrative case study of the 
promise—and eventual failure—of private sector control of water and sewer 
utilities.  Originally enacted in 1997 as the world’s largest privatization plan, 
the privatization of MWSS was aimed at expanding service, lowering water 
rates, and improving the efficiency and operation of the utility.25  Nine years 
later, the MWSS has failed to realize these improvements.  Instead, in the 
autumn of 2005, the government reacquired majority ownership of the utility 
in half of the city as part of a negotiated plan to save the majority 
shareholder from bankruptcy.26  The Philippine government’s current plan is 
to auction off its shares in an effort to re-privatize the utility. 27  The Manila 
experience demonstrates the flaws in the current privatization agreements 
and highlights the need for an alternative paradigm. 
A. Privatization Promised to Expand Water Service and Improve Quality 
In 1996, privatization held much promise for the MWSS, a poorly run 
and flailing public utility.  Originally built in 1878, the MWSS is one of 
                                           
25
 MARK DUMOL, THE MANILA WATER CONCESSION: A KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL’S DIARY OF 
THE WORLD’S LARGEST WATER PRIVATIZATION 1 (2000). 
26
 Felipe F. Salvosa II, Maynilad ‘Reprivatization’ to Be Finalized by June – Finance Dep’t, 
BUSINESSWORLD (Phil.), Jan. 6, 2006. 
27
 Mencias, supra note 24. 
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Asia’s oldest water and sewer utilities.28  In the early 1990s, as the country 
emerged from a lengthy rule by the dictator Ferdinand Marcos,29 the MWSS 
was marred by water losses from leaking pipes and pilfering, sporadic water 
service that totaled only 16 hours a day, and disappointing connection 
rates.30  A substantial portion of the population was unconnected to the piped 
network system.31  The sewer system was especially deficient in that more 
than ninety-two percent of the city was without sewage treatment.32  The 
most pressing concern for the government was the utility’s huge debt owed 
to international financial institutions.33  
As the Philippines transitioned from the fourteen-year rule of Marcos 
to the democratic administration of Corazon Aquino, international lending 
institutions including the World Bank encouraged the new democracy to 
privatize government-owned industries and utilities.34  Proponents of 
privatization argued that government-owned utilities were inefficient and 
that private companies were better suited to managing utilities, because they 
created incentives for expanded service and efficient use of resources.35  
Further, proponents of privatization contended that government-
owned water bureaucracies displayed weaknesses in everything from 
competence and administrative acumen to political control and perverse 
incentive structures.36  They asserted privatization could mean more 
affordable water rates and increased access to clean water because the 
market created incentives to expand connections and charge lower rates.37  
                                           
28
 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, About Us, http://www.mwss.gov.ph/aboutus.asp 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
29
 See generally MARK R. THOMPSON, THE ANTI-MARCOS STRUGGLE: PERSONALISTIC RULE AND 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN THE PHILIPPINES (1995) (detailing the Marcos regime and its eventual fall). 
30
 DUMOL, supra note 25, at 5. 
31
 FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, supra note 22, at 1. 
32
 DUMOL, supra note 25, at 5. 
33
 FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, supra note 22, at 1. 
34
 The privatization of the Buenos Aires water system, for example, emerged from years of 
authoritarian rule as Argentina transitioned to democracy.  During this period, Carlos Menem aggressively 
pursued economic reforms, including the privatization of several sectors by Presidential decree. See 
generally Alex Loftus & David A. McDonald, Lessons from Argentina: The Buenos Aires Water 
Concession, at 7, Municipal Services Project: Occasional Papers Series Number 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.queensu.ca/msp/pages/Project_Publications/Series/PapersNo2.pdf; see also David Hall, 
Introduction to RECLAIMING PUBLIC WATER: ACHIEVEMENTS, STRUGGLES, AND VISIONS FROM AROUND 
THE WORLD 15, 19 (Belén Balanyá et al. eds., 2005). 
35
 ALAN SHIPMAN, THE MARKET REVOLUTION AND ITS LIMITS: A PRICE FOR EVERYTHING 395 
(1999). 
36
 FREDRIK SEGERFELDT, WATER FOR SALE: HOW BUSINESS AND THE MARKET CAN RESOLVE THE 
WORLD’S WATER CRISIS 21 (2005). 
37
 TROUBLED WATER, supra note 17, at 38. 
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Moreover, such expansion would be possible because private companies 
would have the capital to invest in infrastructure and new technologies.38    
Given the deteriorated infrastructure of the MWSS, water losses, and 
international debt, such arguments appealed to Philippine policymakers.  
Mark Dumol, a key policy maker in the MWSS, argued that bureaucratic 
procedural requirements, enacted after the Marcos regime to achieve 
transparent decision-making, actually tied projects “into knots” and 
produced years of delay.39  In addition to procedural inefficiencies, the 
MWSS was overstaffed, with 13 employees to every 1,000 water 
connections.  In contrast, the water utility in Jakarta, Indonesia, considered 
an “efficient” utility, in 2001 had 5.3 workers for every 1,000 connections.40  
Lastly, held entirely by the government, the MWSS was severely in debt, 
which added to the national debt.41  
In 1997, in response to the crumbling water infrastructure and 
critiques of government bureaucracy, Philippine President Fidel Ramos 
privatized the MWSS.42  Using concession agreements43 based on models of 
privatization enacted in other countries, Ramos turned over responsibility for 
the operation and maintenance of the MWSS to two companies: the 
Maynilad Water Service, Inc. and Manila Water Company.44 The former, a 
partnership between the transnational water company Suez and Benpres 
Holdings, owned by an elite Filipino family, won the western half of the city, 
while the latter, a group of international investors, including Bechtel and the 
local firm Ayala Corporation, won the eastern half.45  The 25-year 
concessionary agreement was ambitious.46  It established benchmarks for 
water quality.47  It also required the companies to obtain water connections 
                                           
38
 DUMOL, supra note 25, at 19. 
39
 Id. at 16-17. 
40
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, WATER IN ASIAN CITIES: UTILITIES’ PERFORMANCE AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY VIEWS 45 (Charles T. Andrews & Cesar E. Yñiguez eds., 2004). 
41
 DUMOL, supra note 25, at 19. 
42
 Water Crisis Act of 1995, Rep. Act 8041 (1995) (Phil.). 
43
 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, CASE STUDIES OF BANKABLE 
WATER AND SEWERAGE UTILITIES VOLUME I: OVERVIEW REPORT 14 (2005), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE147.pdf.  Such an agreement “gives a private company responsibility 
for not only the operation and maintenance of a utility’s assets, but also for its capital investments .  In 
return for assuming this responsibility, the concessionaire is given full-use rights of the assets for the 
concession period, typically 25 to 30 years.  Ownership of the assets remains with the government, and use 
rights revert to the government upon expiration of the concession.”  Id. 
44
 DUMOL, supra note 25, at 93-98. 
45
 Id. at 82 (describing how Philippine law requires sixty percent ownership in utilities by firms 
incorporated in the Philippines); Const. (1987) art. XII, §11 (Phil.). 
46
 DUMOL, supra note 25, at 56. 
47
 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System Concession Agreement, art. 5.1.4 (1997), 
available at http://www.mwss.gov.ph/files/Concession%20Agreement.PDF [hereinafter Concession 
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to 100% of households in their areas within the first ten years and provide 24 
hours of water supply each day.48  The agreement also aimed to reduce water 
losses, often due to leaking pipes and illegal connections, from 56% to 
32%.49  Capital investments were also required for $7.5 billion during the 
life of the contract for infrastructure and other improvements.50  The 
privatization of the MWSS was hailed as the first large-scale water utility 
project in Asia.51 
B. Affordability, Quality, and Accessibility Have Deteriorated Since 
Privatization 
Despite its promise, the privatization of the MWSS has diminished the 
public’s access to quality water.52  After privatization, water became less 
affordable.  Although water rates initially declined and services improved in 
the immediate aftermath of privatization, both concessionaries requested 
15% tariff increases from the regulatory body within two years of the 
agreement.53  This was only the first of a series of rate increases, which 
eventually left rates 500-700% higher nine years after privatization.54  For 
most residents of the city, higher rates have resulted in a substantial portion 
of their income going to water and sewer service.55  
Although the MWSS has made some improvements in the number of 
water connections throughout the city, these figures are still below the 
United Nations’ goals for connectivity, and below the targets outlined in the 
concession agreement.56  An Asian Development Bank report found that as 
of 2004, approximately 58% of the city was connected to the water 
network.57  The sewer service is in a particularly bad state, with no 
improvement since privatization.  In 2001, 93% of the city or 10 million 
residents lacked access to the sewer and waste system.58  A 2003 World 
                                                                                                                              
Agreement] (detailing the major commitments for each party and separate schedules document the specific 
benchmarks). 
48
 Id. at art. 5.1.2. 
49
 Id. at art. 5.1.4. 
50
 Id. at art. 5. 
51
 DUMOL, supra note 25, at 1. 
52
 See FRANCES T.C. LO, MAKING THE PUBLIC WORK: ALTERNATIVE TO MANILA WATER 
PRIVATIZATION, http://www.tni.org/asem-hanoi/franceswater.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).  
53
 FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, supra note 22, at 1; Public Citizen, supra note 21. 
54
 FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, supra note 22, at 1-2.  
55
 Public Citizen, supra note 21. 
56
 Concession Agreement, supra note 47, at art. 5. 
57
 WATER IN ASIAN CITIES, supra note 40, at 53. 
58
 Id. at 52. 
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Bank study found that Manila was one of the worst major Asian cities, 
second only to Jakarta, in relation to water and sewer access.59  
In addition to coming up short on the claims of privatization, on 
several occasions the transfer of the MWSS has proven to be dangerous to 
public health.  In 2003, the treatment of water by the companies produced an 
outbreak of cholera, which left more than 600 sick and six dead.60  A study 
that same year by the University of the Philippines’ Natural Sciences 
Research Institute found that Maynilad’s water was contaminated with E. 
coli bacteria at 16 per 100 ml of water or more than 700% the national 
regulatory standard of 2.2 per 100 ml of water.61  Private sector operation of 
the water utility has created no meaningful improvements in water quality 
and failed to meet the standards of the concession agreement. 
C. Despite the Significant Problems, Private Sector Involvement Is Still 
Needed 
Despite the failing system, the Philippine government does not have 
the capital to invest in the MWSS and make it operationally viable.  The 
utility owes well over US$ 150 million in international and domestic debt.62  
As many critics of privatization in the Philippines have conceded, for 
developing countries, private sector investment may be necessary.63  A re-
nationalization of the MWSS is simply impossible because “the current 
government is mired in a fiscal crisis that may degenerate into an economic 
meltdown if not resolved within the next two or three years.  There are no 
public funds to finance the utility.”64  Given the lack of funds, privatization 
remains an important mechanism for bringing both investment and 
efficiency to the utility. 
                                           
59
 Blanche S. Rivera, 11M in Metro Have No Sewer Access, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 2, 2005, at 
A17. 
60
 FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, supra note 22, at 7. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Press Release, Freedom from Debt Coalition, On Maynilad’s Revised Rehabilitation Plan: GMA 
Administration Fails as People’s First Line of Defense! (Oct. 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.cyberdyaryo.com/press_release/pr2004_1009_02.htm. 
63
 Carla Montemayor, Possibilities for Public Water in Manila, in RECLAIMING PUBLIC WATER, 
supra note 34, at 213, 217 (2005) (arguing that the financial crisis in the Philippines may prohibit 
government ownership). 
64
 Id. at 222. 
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III. CURRENT FRAMEWORKS FOR WATER UTILITIES ARE FIXATED IN A 
DEBATE OVER PUBLIC OR MARKET BASED UTILITIES 
Privatization has become an increasingly contentious yet prominent 
economic model often promoted by international lending agencies like the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.65  Privatization of water 
utilities accelerated in the 1990s, including projects in Laos, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia.66  As these international organizations pushed plans for 
privatization, an often contentious and polarized debate emerged within the 
international community among policymakers, economists, and social justice 
advocates about who should provide water services.  The debate turns on a 
market-based or public-based approach to water policy.  This debate and the 
proposed models of private or public water fail to account for the realities of 
lesser-developed countries, where water privatization has proved harmful to 
water access and where government ownership is simply not feasible. 
A. Proponents of Privatization Argue the Private Sector Is More Capable 
of Expanding Water Services 
For more than two decades, proponents have argued that privatization 
can solve the vexing problem of water distribution through the competitive 
marketplace.  In laying out their position, advocates of privatization first 
criticize government ownership of water utilities as inefficient and 
bureaucratic.67  They contend governments are ill-suited to distribute 
resources because they lack the expertise and incentives to act efficiently.68  
For government actors, they argue, there is simply no economic incentive or 
pressure from shareholders to expand service areas or lower the number of 
employees.  Curtailing government corruption is also proffered as a benefit 
of privatization.  Proponents of privatization argue that individuals engage in 
rent seeking behavior by seeking public involvement in the economy in 
ways that benefit themselves but artificially set prices or create demand.69  
Without a commercial basis for these prices or demand, individual actors in 
the government seek to benefit themselves.70  
                                           
65
 MARTIN, supra note 17, at 3. 
66
 WATER IN ASIAN CITIES, supra note 40, at 44, 50, 66.  
67
 BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI & DOMENICO SINISCALCO, THE CHALLENGES OF PRIVATIZATION: AN 
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 7 (2004). 
68
 See, e.g., JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 4 (1989). 
69
 Mick Moore, Rent-seeking and Market Surrogates: The Case of Irrigation Policy, in STATES OR 
MARKETS?: NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY DEBATE 279-80 (Christopher Colclough & 
James Manor eds., 1991). 
70
 Id. at 283. 
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In addition to criticizing government ownership of water utilities, 
proponents contend privatization creates social benefits.71  Privatization 
promotes economic stability, creates markets that are more responsive to 
consumer demand than centralized governments, and provides incentives to 
invest in infrastructure.72  To be profitable, private companies typically 
require full cost recovery for all expenditures.  As a standard model, full cost 
recovery methodically establishes pricing where utilities recover operation 
and maintenance costs based entirely on the rate consumers pay for water.73  
Profitability hinges on these consumer rates. 
Proponents also argue de-regulation and a limited role for the state are 
central to the project of privatization.  Private companies are best able to 
deliver goods such as water because market competition encourages 
efficiency.  Privatization requires an “unbundling” of the government’s role, 
including ownership and de-regulation. 74  This “unbundling,” meaning a 
withdrawal of state regulation, is a prerequisite to allowing free market 
competition free from government interference.75 
Although rhetorically privatization calls for governments to assume a 
smaller role in the economy, the state plays a central part in the private 
sector model by maintaining and improving economic conditions.76  
According to proponents of privatization, the proper role for the government 
in a privatized system is to promote market competition.77  This is to prevent 
abuses associated with monopoly control, where a state-owned entity simply 
transfers ownership to private hands.78  Thus, governments should act to 
break up monopolies and encourage competition.79  Such reforms to promote 
competition include removing entry barriers such as licensing requirements, 
opening markets to foreign competition, and enforcing competition laws.80  
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B. Advocates for Public Water Critique Privatization for Commodifying 
Water and Harming the Public Interest 
In sharp contrast, proponents of public ownership of water contend 
privatization is a failed model, and public ownership is the only viable 
alternative.81  Critics lodge two main arguments against privatization: first, 
water is a public resource and should not be commodified.  Second, 
privatization is incompatible with regulation because it fundamentally alters 
the democratic control of public resources.82  Given these substantial flaws, 
they argue water utilities should be publicly owned.   
Public water advocates contest the very assumption that water should 
be privatized, arguing that water is a public resource and should not be sold 
because it would be as implausible as “leasing the rain.”83  Sociologist Erik 
Swyngedouw explains the transformation of a public resource to a 
commodified good:  
[P]rivatization is a process through which activities, resources, 
and the like, which had not been formally privately owned, 
managed or organized, are taken away from whoever or 
whatever owned them before and transferred to a new property 
configuration that is based on some form of ‘private’ ownership 
or control.  Privatization, therefore, is nothing else than a 
legally and institutionally condoned, if not encouraged, form of 
theft.84 
The shift from water utilities as a public service operated by the government 
to a privatized system operated for profit seems antithetical to the essential 
nature of water to sustain life.85  Governments are the only legitimate actors 
who can provide water services and simultaneously protect the public 
interest through regulation and policy initiatives.86  
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Public water advocates cite a number of failed privatization projects, 
which demonstrate the adverse impacts of privatization on poor 
communities.87  For example, the introduction of water meters in black 
townships of Johannesburg, South Africa by a privately owned water utility 
meant many residents were “forced to choose between buying enough food 
to eat and buying water for basic hygiene and sanitation.”88  Public water 
proponents argue that under a capitalist system, private companies are 
predisposed to rate increases in order to expand profits and achieve growth.  
These recurring rate increases force poor people to make trade-off decisions 
between water and other necessities.89  Critics of privatization worry that as 
water becomes increasingly scarce, markets will price water out of the reach 
of ordinary people across the globe.90  
Further, public water proponents argue water privatization results in 
diminished regulation, oversight, and accountability because agreements 
often remove all mechanisms that normally protect the public interest.91  
Under a capitalist scenario, private companies have little incentive to pursue 
public policy goals, such as water subsidies for the poor, because such 
subsidies may be unprofitable.92  Moreover, regulation is often voluntary or 
included within the privatization agreements.  In voluntary self-regulation 
agreements, the loss of public accountability and public policy goals are 
especially acute because private companies are not accountable through 
democratic participation.93  Even if water is provided by the private 
companies, the task remains “[a] public responsibilit[y] . . . and the market is 
often more a metaphor than a reality.”94  Finally, and most incisively, critics 
of privatization argue privatization reconfigures the relationship between the 
state and private sector in ways that hurt the public interest.  Privatization 
                                           
87
 Vandana Shiva, Don’t Buy the Lie: Myths of Privatization, in TROUBLED WATER, supra note 17, 
at 34-45. 
88
 Matthew Kavanagh, Operation Vula Manzi; (Open Water); Resisting Water Privatization in South 
Africa, CLAMOR, Nov./Dec. 2005, at 44.  
89
 Jon Luoma, The Water Thieves, ECOLOGIST, Mar. 2004, at 52, 54. 
90
 See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 83, at xviii (arguing that water is a collective good and should 
not be allowed to be “privatized, commodified, traded, or exported for commercial purposes”); John 
Luoma, Water for Profit, MOTHER JONES, Nov./Dec. 2002 at 34, 88.  For example, in Ghana after the 
government privatized water utilities, the cost of running water topped $110 a year, in a country where the 
average annual income is less than $400.  Id. 
91
 ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW 
REFORM 89-90 (2004) (arguing globalization and privatization have created a new form of “governance,” 
which has shifted the relationship between the state and the market, and private companies have 
increasingly defined public policy and left the state with a substantially narrower role).   
92
 See id. at 89-90. 
93
 Alfred Aman, Jr.,  Privatization and the Democracy Problem Globalization: Making the Markets 
More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477, 1478 (2001). 
94
 AMAN, supra note 91, at 99. 
778 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 3 
 
 
creates a governance model aimed solely at building a competitive 
marketplace, not at achieving public policy goals.95  Once water utilities 
have been privatized, water policy is subsequently driven not by public 
objectives, but by private interests and market demands.96  Further, 
privatization may affect citizens’ relationship with the state, by discouraging 
democratic participation and engendering a general alienation from the 
government.97  
C. The Debate over Private or Public Ownership of Water Utilities 
Ignores the Realties of Developing Countries 
The current models for privately or publicly owned water utilities do 
not adequately account for the conditions within developing countries.  
Lesser-developed countries pose unique challenges to the framework of 
privatization, because their economies often lack a strong and competitive 
marketplace.98   First, it is worth noting that privatization most often occurs 
in lesser-developed countries after other economic models have faltered.  
Privatization is implemented after a different economic strategy has failed, 
and to comply with requirements by international lending agencies to secure 
loans or other forms of investment.99  As development scholar and law 
professor Maxwell Chibundu notes, “the current trend toward privatization 
expresses the belief that a dead end has been reached in one direction, and 
the other road must be taken.”100  Because the economy is weak when 
privatization is implemented, the conditions are not suitable for private 
competition.   
Similarly, proponents of public water ignore the lack of capital in 
lesser-developed countries and ignore the legacy of public utilities, which 
are often marked by inefficiency and corruption.  The Asian Development 
Bank estimates US$ 6.3 billion annually is needed to provide universal 
access to clean drinking water.101  In the face of such drastic under-
capitalization and a dearth of public funds, publicly owned systems are 
                                           
95
 Ernst von Weizsäcker, The General Context, Post-War History: The Ups and Downs of the Public 
Sector, in LIMITS TO PRIVATIZATION, supra note at 74, at 175, 185. 
96
 See Zillah Eisenstein, Stop Stomping on the Rest of Us: Retrieving the Publicness from 
Privatization of the Globe, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 61 (1996). 
97
 Ernest von Weizsäcker et al., Lessons Learned from Privatization, in LIMITS OF PRIVATIZATION, 
supra note 74, at 351, 357. 
98
 Baker, supra note 9, at 258. 
99
 Id. at 243. 
100
 Maxwell O. Chibundu,  The Shift in Markets: New Movements in International Law Responding to 
Privatization, 87 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 105, 119 (1993), cited in Baker, supra note 9, at 243. 
101
 Sector Note on Water Supply, supra note 5, at 5.  
SEPTEMBER 2006 THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 779 
  
simply not feasible.  Moreover, as the experience in Manila in the 1980s and 
early 1990s indicates, publicly owned water utilities can suffer from chronic 
inefficiency and corruption.102  Lesser-developed countries are in dire need 
of an alternative water-supply paradigm, one that recognizes the unique, 
essential nature of water for life.   
IV. EMERGING NOTIONS OF WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT RECAST THIS 
DEBATE AND PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Recognizing water as fundamental to life provides an alternative 
model for the debate about private or publicly owned water utilities.  Water 
as a human right has become an important force over the last decade, with 
both international and domestic recognition of this right.103  Unlike the 
current discourse over water, which identifies ownership as the key criteria 
to shape water policy, a human rights paradigm shifts policy to focus on the 
role of water for individuals and communities.104 
A. International Law Recognizes the Human Right to Water 
International bodies and some nations recognize the human right to 
water as an emerging legal category within international law.105  
International bodies like the United Nations have recognized that water is 
fundamental to human life instead of regarding it as an economic good.106  
Although the right to water has not been expressly recognized, some 
scholars have implied it from international agreements,107 because water 
“sits at the very essence of the right to life and other fundamental rights.”108  
Additionally, some international instruments have explicitly recognized this 
right.109 
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1. Treaties and Conventions Recognize the Human Right to Water 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UNDHR”), adopted in 
1948, articulated the basic components of human rights, including the 
concept that human rights are universal and international.110  One of the 
most significant rights established by the UNDHR is stated in Article 3: 
“everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person.”111  In 
addition, Article 25 of UNDHR explains that each person has the “right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of 
his family.”112  Both of these provisions are a significant basis for the human 
right to water because water is a necessary precondition to realize these 
rights.  While the most fundamental provisions of the UNDHR are 
incorporated into international customary law, the provisions that imply a 
right to water, namely Articles 3 and 25, are not binding on states.113 
Subsequent covenants to the UNDHR are also a basis for the human 
right to water.114  The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), which was approved by the United Nations in 
1966, “recognize[s] the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living 
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”115  Often called a 
“second generation right,” water has been primarily understood to be a right 
that is implied in the ICSECR because it is “necessary to achieve primary 
human rights.”116  Beginning in the 1970s, the international community 
explicitly recognized water as an essential human right.117  In 1977, the Mar 
del Plata Conference in Argentina marked the international community’s 
first declaration on the necessity of water for life.118  
In 2002, General Comment 15, issued by the Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ECOSOC”), characterized water as 
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both a fundamental human need, essential for life, and a prerequisite for the 
realization of other human rights.119  ECOSOC issues comments to assist 
state parties with fulfilling their obligation under ICESCR and to create 
authoritative interpretations of the covenant.120  Although not binding 
customary international law, like some provisions of UNDHR, the comments 
are authoritative interpretations of the covenant.121  General Comment 15 
formally recognizes an independent right to water, and explains “the human 
right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity.”122  As the 
Comment states, “safe water is necessary to prevent death from dehydration, 
to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, 
cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements.”123  
Comment 15 also establishes state obligations to realize the right to 
water.  States have a duty to “move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible towards the full realization of the right to water.”124  Further, states 
are obligated to prevent the infringement of these rights by third parties, 
including private companies operating water utilities.  When water is 
distributed by the private sector, “[s]tates parties must prevent them [the 
private sector] from compromising equal, affordable, and physical access to 
sufficient, safe and acceptable water.”125   
2. States Should Recognize and Protect the Human Right to Water 
Through Non-Binding International Agreements 
General Comment 15 provides the strongest mechanism for 
enforcement by making the first incorporation of an explicit right to water 
into the ICESCR.126  General Comment 15 is not a legally binding 
document, but it is significant because it interprets ICESCR to include a 
right to water.127  The Comment offers guidance to state parties on how to 
implement the ICESCR and should be viewed as an authoritative 
interpretation of ICESCR.128  Currently, ECOSOC lacks the legal authority 
to create new obligations for states under ICESCR129 and does not have 
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mechanisms to solve disputes about the dimension of obligations under the 
ICESCR.130  Although states are not required to immediately guarantee 
covenants, they must implement the agreements progressively and to the 
extent permitted by their resources.131  General Comment 15 could obligate 
states to progressively achieve the human right to water if its provisions 
were adopted into a legally binding international instrument.132  Thus, 
General Comment 15 possesses the important function of establishing a 
settled interpretation of ICESCR and could be an effective mechanism for 
ensuring the human right to water. 133 
B. Nations Are Implementing the Human Right to Water into Domestic 
Laws 
In addition to international treaties and covenants that recognize the 
human right to water, nations have also recognized this right domestically.134  
A right to water is implied in the constitutions of 42 nations, which provide 
general guarantees for a healthy environment to sustain life.135  These 
nations include several in the Asian Pacific region such as Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Japan, Korea, and Laos.136  As of 2004, eight nations have 
included provisions to protect access to water in their respective 
constitutions.137  For example, Article 14 of the Ugandan Constitution 
creates an affirmative duty on the state to protect the right to water by 
mandating that “[t]he State shall endeavour to fulfill the fundamental rights 
of all Ugandans to social justice and economic development and shall, in 
particular, ensure that . . . all Ugandans enjoy rights and opportunities and 
access to . . . clean and safe water. . . .”138  Most recently, in Uruguay a 
popular referendum reformed the Constitution to add provisions that 
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explicitly recognize the human right to water.139  Passed with more than two-
thirds of the popular vote, the constitutional amendment called access to 
water “essential for life,” amounting to a “human right.”140  Although such 
efforts represent a minority of nations, the global direction as indicated by 
Comment 15 is for greater recognition of such rights.  Further, the numerous 
recognitions of the human right to water can be interpreted as state practice 
to establish customary international law.  As more nations execute these 
norms into domestic law they will create a solid basis for a right to water 
under international customary law.141 
V. IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER, DOMESTIC 
IMPLEMENTATION IS NEEDED 
Regardless of whether private or public entities own and operate water 
utilities, governments must first recognize the human right to water and 
ensure these entities respect the human right to water.  States must therefore 
retain control over water policy and regulation to “ensure both minimal and 
progressive access to needed services on a nondiscriminatory basis.”142  In 
contrast to the model proposed by advocates of privatization, where 
governments cede all control and regulation except to foster competition, a 
human rights framework mandates active government protection of these 
rights.143  This means “states cannot allow market forces and pure profit to 
drive the provisions of basic service.”144  This section outlines the basic 
elements of a domestic implementation of the human right to water.  
Although no nation has fully implemented the human right to water,145 South 
Africa’s Water Services Act and program to create universal access represent 
the best efforts to date to implement a comprehensive water policy that 
recognizes and protects the human right to water.146 
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A. The Human Right to Water Requires Accessibility, Adequate Quality, 
and Quantity of Water 
As General Comment 15 outlines, implementation of the human right 
to water requires states to protect the essential elements of this right. 147  The 
substantive components to a human right to water include accessibility, 
sufficient quality, and adequate quality of water.148  The most central element 
to the human right to water is that water must be accessible.  Accessibility 
means water is obtainable within a short distance from the home, it is 
affordable, and the distribution of water is free from discrimination.  
Additionally, accessibility also means the ability to participate in decision-
making about water policy and information about water issues. 149  Both 
quantity and quality of water are also essential items to ensure the right to 
water is both sufficient and healthy.150  
B. As the South African Model Shows, Universal Access Is a 
Fundamental Component to the Human Right to Water 
South Africa is one of the few countries that recognizes a human right 
to water in its Constitution and has enacted domestic legislation 
guaranteeing each person a minimum amount of water per day.151  The 
explicit recognition of the human right to water is coupled with a national 
water policy that implements a universal access program.152  Although the 
water policy has faced criticism for not expanding water access expediently 
enough, it nevertheless exemplifies one major approach to implementing the 
human right to water. 
In response to the disparities of apartheid South Africa,153 the 1996 
Constitution attempts to remedy socio-economic inequalities by broadly 
guaranteeing basic rights, including the right to sufficient water.154  Section 
27(1)(b) of the Constitution defines that “everyone has the right . . . to have 
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access to sufficient food and water.”155  Further, the state must “take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.”156 
In order to implement these rights, the South African legislature 
passed the Water Services Act (“WSA”), which creates a domestic 
framework to protect the right to water.157  The law declares that because 
water is a human right “every water services institution must take reasonable 
measures to realise these rights.  Every water services authority must, in its 
water services development plan, provide for measures to realise these 
rights.”158  WSA has created several significant measures including 
decentralized control of water decisions through Water Services Authorities 
(“WSAU”). Every WSAU has the duty to “all consumers or potential 
consumers in its area of jurisdiction to progressively ensure efficient, 
affordable, economical and sustainable access to water services.”159  The law 
explicitly allows for the contracting of water services to private companies, 
but requires such companies to abide by all provisions of the WSA.160  
Further, in interpreting the Constitution and WSA, South African courts have 
held that the right to water requires proper due process before a utility can 
disconnect a user for lack of payment.161  Moreover, in Residents of Bon 
Vista Mansions v. South Metro Local Council, a court held that service 
cannot be disconnected if a person shows they do not have the means to 
pay.162 
In 2000, a major modification was made to the WSA when South 
African President Thabo Mbeki initiated the Free Basic Water policy 
(“FBW”), which provides 6000 liters per month to poor households each 
month free of charge (based on an average size of a household of eight 
people).163  The FBW supplies this water subsidy to poor households 
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through an application process.  FBW is a landmark achievement;164 within 
two years of implementation, 27 million South Africans enjoyed this right.165 
Although some lawmakers and poverty activists in South Africa 
contend the water policy has not fully implemented a human right to 
water,166 the WSA and FBW are significant improvements over the previous 
system based solely upon privatization.167  Whereas before this legislation 
water prices had soared beyond what poor and middle class South Africans 
could afford, now the poorest of South Africans are provided with at least a 
minimal amount of water.168  The South African model is an important, but 
not ultimate, step in achieving the human right to water. 
C. To Realize the Human Right to Water, States Must Regulate Water 
Utilities  
In order to translate the rhetoric of the human right to water into 
concrete protections, states must respect and tend the human right to water 
through regulation.169  In addition to policies aimed at achieving universal 
access, regulation is essential to achieve these goals and protections for the 
human right to water. 170  Although a full fledged regulatory scheme that 
protects the human right to water has not been developed, such a system 
would be based on the essential elements of the human right to water.171  In 
order to foster accessibility, this regulatory system would include 
independent monitoring, public participation, and transparent decision-
making.172  To ensure water quality is not compromised, the state must 
monitor for health and safety and impose penalties when water suppliers do 
not comply.173  Further, as will be discussed further in Part VII, elements of 
the human right to water exist in the regulatory systems of a number of 
countries, including Malaysia and Brazil. 
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VI. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IS NOT PROTECTED IN THE PHILIPPINES 
The basic components of the human right to water are not protected in 
the Philippines.  Foremost, there is no explicit recognition of this right.  The 
Philippine Constitution, enacted in 1987, contains a number of human rights 
provisions, including a general right to a healthy environment.174  This does 
not ensure or protect the human right to access to water.  Further, the two 
main components of domestic implementation of the human right to water 
are inadequate. 
A. Lack of Access Prevents the Realization of the Human Right to Water 
Although in June of 2005 Gloria Arroyo vowed to bring clean 
drinking water to all households in the Philippines within 5 years, such 
efforts have not been initiated.175  Water appropriation is not based on 
equality or guaranteed access.  Issued in 1976 by President Ferdinand 
Marcos, Executive Order No. 1067, the Philippine Water Code establishes a 
basic framework for appropriation and utilization of water, including 
establishing a system of water rights.176  Specifically, the Water Code 
declares that all water belongs to the state and can be appropriated by the 
state.177  The code specifically allows for the appropriation of water for 
domestic purposes, meaning, “Use of water for domestic purposes is the 
utilization of water for drinking, washing, bathing, cooking or other 
household needs, home gardens, and watering or lawns or domestic 
animals.”178  However, the code does not include any recognition of the 
human right to water or provide for universal access.  Water rates in Manila 
compound the issue of access.  As detailed above in Part II, water rates are 
tremendously high and connection fees often run upwards of $100.179 
B. Regulatory Mechanisms Do Not Protect the Right to Water 
In addition to the general laws of the Philippines being inadequate to 
protect the human right to water, regulation of the MWSS is inadequate and 
allows the utility to violate this right.  Although the Local Water Utilities 
Authority law governs the regulation of most water utilities in the 
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Philippines, it exempts the MWSS from this oversight.180  Instead, the 
regulation of the MWSS is part of the privatization agreement.181  The 
contract established a semiautonomous body to approve rate adjustments and 
oversee implementation of the contract. 182  These responsibilities include 
ensuring water quality meets national levels and approving rate increases.  
The private companies fund the operations of the regulatory body.  Members 
of the regulatory body are appointed and are not democratically elected.183 
As detailed above in Part II, the privatization of the MWSS has failed 
to achieve the targeted goals of the contract.  The Regulatory Office failed to 
regulate the MWSS in any meaningful way; it has allowed rapid rate 
increases and water quality to fall below national standards.  The 
regulation’s structure is not conducive to ensuring the goals of the contract 
were met and the public’s interest was protected.  As a number of critics of 
privatized water in Manila have pointed out, the Regulatory Office has no 
“teeth” to enforce the provisions of the agreement.  Even the current head of 
the Regulatory Office, Herman Cimafranca, has noted the body’s lack of 
enforcement mechanisms: “This is, to tell you frankly, almost a spineless 
and toothless paper tiger . . . if we tell them to cease and desist from 
implementing these rates . . . they will not follow because the 
concessionaires will say that we have no right to do that.” 184  This lack of 
clear enforcement and mandate forced the Regulatory Office to behave more 
as a “neutral negotiator” between the companies and the Philippine 
government than as a regulator.185  The Regulatory Office’s role as a 
negotiator rather than regulator is evident in the recent tariff price increase.  
The Regulatory Office negotiated lower rate increases, still beyond the 
contract’s provisions, in exchange for reduced service targets.186  
Another structural problem in the concession agreement with the 
private companies is the lack of public participation and transparency.  The 
Regulatory Office members are explicitly appointed, with no term limits and 
no public accountability.  Further, the Regulatory Office has no provision for 
public participation or inclusion, which might shape the policy of the board.  
The lack of transparency has left the Regulatory Office open to accusations 
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of corruption and collusion with the private companies.187  Civil society 
groups, like the Philippine Water Vigilance Network, have been especially 
critical of the repeated government funded bailouts of the private companies, 
and the Regulatory Office’s approval of these arrangements. 188  Most 
recently, they point to the government’s decision in late 2005 to buy an 
eighty-four percent interest in the Maynilad Corporation, which allowed 
some of the company’s shareholders to withdraw from the agreement 
without serious financial harm.189  The Regulatory Office approved the deal, 
even though the contract contained no provision for a buyout arrangement.  
An audit by a nonpartisan government agency was critical of the buyout, 
saying it was “disadvantageous” to the government190 and at the expense of 
the public interest.191  Such accusations indicate the lack of transparency and 
fundamental lack of public confidence in the concession agreement and 
Regulatory Office. 
C. Policy Makers and Social Justice Advocates Are Overly Fixated on 
the Public/Private Dichotomy in Envisioning a New Water Policy 
Discourse over privatization in the Philippines, like the global debate, 
is stale and fixated on public or private ownership of water utilities.192  Re-
privatizing the utility has simply renewed promises of greater efficiency, 
heightened expectations for improved performance, and decreased water 
rates.193  Simultaneously, social justice advocates continue to wholly reject 
privatization, pointing to the recent failure of the MWSS as proof that 
utilities must be owned by the government.194 
VII. THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD IMPLEMENT THE ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF 
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 
Privatized water in Manila shows the need for the Philippines to 
provide greater protection of the public’s interest, including the recognition 
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of the human right to water.  Like many developing countries, the 
Philippines does not have public capital to invest in water utilities.195  As the 
experience of Manila shows, the essential right to water is violated by 
inadequate access to clean, affordable water and insufficient regulation.196  
The Philippines must reshape how privatization is taking place by enacting 
legislation that regulates the water sector and provides protections for the 
human right to water.  In the case of the Philippines, the human right to 
water serves as a basis to balance the interests of the public and private 
sectors. 
A. Recognition of the Human Right to Water Is Essential 
A constitutional amendment that recognizes the human right to water 
is essential to ensure that all Filipinos have access to water.  A constitutional 
amendment would establish water as an entitlement and create a government 
obligation.197  Such a step would create a fundamental right that guarantees 
“sufficient, safe, acceptable, accessible and affordable water, without 
discrimination.”198 
Making the right to water an explicit constitutionally protected right 
would mean citizens have a cause of action if that right is infringed.199  As 
cases in South Africa show, this is an important legal tool.  For example, the 
Supreme Court of South Africa held in Government of South Africa v. 
Grootboom that the government had a duty to ensure constitutional rights are 
achieved, and that it must take reasonable steps to realize these rights.200   
A constitutional provision creates an affirmative obligation for the 
government to safeguard this right, regardless of who owns a water utility.  
Thus, a guaranteed right to water in the Philippine Constitution is important 
because it will protect the right to water, regardless of whether public or 
private companies operate water utilities.201 
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B. To Achieve Universal Access, the Philippines Should Develop a Free 
Basic Water Program 
Following the example of South Africa, the Philippines should adopt a 
policy of universal water access.  The full cost recovery model, currently 
used by the private companies in Manila, impedes universal access because 
it has produced significant rate hikes.  Because water privatization often 
prices the poorest water users out of the market, the Philippine government 
should guarantee this population a sufficient amount of water for survival.202  
Moreover, this population is most likely to lack access to water.203  Using the 
WHO’s calculations for need, the Philippine government should adopt 
legislation to implement a free basic water program.204  Implementing a 
subsidized water program would be an important first step to universal 
access because it would guarantee that even those most likely to be priced 
out of market-based water systems have access, including economic access 
to water.   
Unlike other free water programs, like the policy enacted in South 
Africa, the Philippines should not allow for disconnections if poor 
households fall behind on payment of any water above the subsidized 
amount.205  Without such a provision, the very purpose of the free water 
program to guarantee universal access would be undermined.  Further, in 
some rural areas, the policy may need to be expanded.  Cost benefit analysis 
may show, as it has in South Africa, that the government is better off paying 
for additional subsidized water since this population is at heightened risk of 
exposure to contaminated water in household use.206 
C. The Philippines Should Enact New Regulations to Ensure the Human 
Right to Water Is Not Infringed  
Even if private companies operate water utilities, the Philippines has 
an obligation to ensure the human right to water is protected.207  A 
comprehensive new regulatory law requiring all water utilities, whether 
publicly or privately owned, to comply with basic standards for water 
access, quality and quantity would ensure that the elements of the human 
right to water are respected.  The current method of enacting regulations 
                                           
202
 BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note  83; Hardberger, supra note 110, at para. 72. 
203
 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note  2, at 22. 
204
 Id. 
205
 Mehta, supra note 146, at 19. 
206
 Id. 
207
 Naegele, supra note 10, at 114. 
792 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 3 
 
 
within concession agreements creates the potential for a patchwork of 
regulations, where the public interest right to water is better protected in 
some service areas, while not protected at all in others.  Like the Philippines’ 
recently enacted Clean Water Act, national regulations would create a 
comprehensive national policy.208  The case of private-company abuses of 
the MWSS shows the need for regulation cannot be overemphasized.209  
Regulation is “necessary to ensure the consistent delivery of service 
obligations, to determine ‘efficient’ pricing, to conserve water, to extract 
professionalism from managerial staff, and to ensure the financial viability 
of the utility. . . .”210  Regulation is an essential component of any water 
policy that seeks to protect the right to water. 
1. The Philippines Should Create an Independent Regulatory Body with 
Strong Oversight Mechanisms 
Essential to the implementation of any regulation is the creation of an 
independent regulatory body, with enforcement mandates to hold companies 
or public sector operators accountable if they violate the human right to 
water.211  An independent regulatory structure makes it less likely that an 
authority would be “captured” by private companies, yet promotes the 
greater efficiency of privatization that benefits the consumer.212 
Unlike the Regulatory Office created out of the privatization 
agreement, any new agency must be transparent, accountable, and have clear 
mechanisms to sanction violators.213  To achieve this, members of the 
regulatory board should be democratically elected in order to promote 
responsiveness to the public.  Examples from water management in Penang, 
Malaysia suggest such elements are essential to creating a water policy that 
is both efficient and protects the public’s interest.214  Although the utility in 
Penang is government-owned, its management emulates private participation 
in the water sector by focusing on budget consciousness, yet simultaneously 
retaining an ethos of public service.215  In particular, demands by locals for 
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transparency and accountability resulted in unprecedented levels of scrutiny, 
including election of representatives to the water board.216  Because the 
regulatory board was ultimately responsible to voters, political parties made 
strong regulation of the utility a cornerstone of their platforms.217 
2. The Regulations Should Provide for Increased Public Involvement 
While General Comment 15 includes public participation in water 
decisions as an essential element of the human right to water, the current 
concession agreement contains no such mandate.  In adopting a new 
regulatory framework, the Philippines should include the right of citizens 
and community groups to contribute to water policy.  Such public 
involvement in water management adds an element of “responsive 
regulation,” which allows for flexible and adaptive approaches by including 
perspectives not traditionally included in privatization agreements and 
traditional command and control regulation.218  The participatory budget 
process in Porto Alegre, Brazil, about which other scholars have written 
extensively, exemplifies responsive governance.219  The water and sanitation 
utility includes a “deliberative council” where citizens can voice concerns 
and demands to the utility.220  This level of participation includes shaping the 
developments of the water network into certain parts of the city, decreasing 
contamination of waterborne bacteria, and proposals from citizens for 
budgetary allocations.221  This practice has produced a close relationship 
between users and the utility and has resulted in greater problem solving, as 
the utility is more able to judge community needs and demands.222  The 
council model used in Porto Alegre makes the regulation of the utility more 
fair, “more deliberative, and more accountable.”223  
In the Philippines, public participation in water policy has empirically 
promoted public awareness and increased efficiency.  For example, 
community participation has proved effective in water management to 
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prevent leakage and illegal connections.224  Citizen involvement is key to 
implementing a water policy that is both responsive and effective. 
D. Successful Implementation of the Right to Water Will Depend on 
Extra-Legal Factors  
Whether these efforts are ultimately successful in fixing the failures in 
the privatization of the MWSS and establishing a domestic implementation 
of the human right to water will ultimately hinge on the political will of the 
Philippine government and how private companies respond to such 
measures.  In particular, establishing a broad human right to water in the 
constitution may have implications beyond the utility sector.225  Given the 
Philippines’ chronic water shortages and struggles over water allocation, the 
human right to water may affect the agricultural sector as well.226  
Recognizing this right may, for example, create challenges to riparian water 
rights or to large-scale water projects like dam building and water-diversion 
projects.  Although General Comment 15 provides guidance on these issues, 
the magnitude of these issues may discourage a full implementation of the 
human right to water. 
Given the mobility of private companies, especially the large 
multinational companies that often participate in privatization agreements, 
enacting a domestic right to water policy may create a disincentive for them 
to invest.  Although such possibilities are real, concerns over private sector 
investment should not delay the implementation of the human right to water.  
The experience of the MWSS in the Philippines shows how private 
investment in its current form is unworkable, because it fails to improve 
water service, and in some cases, makes water too expensive to be accessible 
to much of the population.    
Finally, any implementation of the human right to water will take 
flexibility and creativity.  Balancing the public interest in the human right to 
water and privatization will necessarily require a responsive administration.  
Policies enacted to protect one element of the human right to water may 
negatively affect another.  In South Africa, the implementation of the FBW 
has discouraged private companies from expanding water services into poor 
communities because these communities are less likely to pay for any 
additional water they use.227  Facing challenges like these, the regulatory 
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board must create incentives for private investment without jeopardizing the 
human right to water.  
VIII. CONCLUSION  
Privatized water in Manila exemplifies how the privatization of water 
utilities jeopardizes the public’s interest through full cost recovery and 
inadequate regulation.  For lesser-developed countries like the Philippines, 
the answer to this dilemma is not to simply forsake private sector 
involvement in favor of public utilities, because these nations lack the 
capital to make the necessary investments to improve water and expand 
access.  Instead, states must recognize that water plays a crucial role in 
sustaining life and should be defined as an entitlement through a human 
rights framework, rather than as a commodity.  In the case of the Philippines, 
current water law and regulations are inadequate to protect the human right 
to water.  The human right to water could be protected in the Philippines 
through constitutional recognition of this right, a universal-access policy that 
provides subsidized water to the poorest residents, and stronger regulation of 
water utilities. 
